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On June 26, 2002, an article in the Washington Post quoted the Chief
Economist at Morgan Stanley as saying "[t]he economy and markets right
now are in the midst of a full-blown corporate governance shock ... to pre-
sume somehow that it is over or the worst is behind us is naive." A few
weeks later, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley bill, which mandated
sweeping changes in the governance of publicly held companies in the
United States. Congressional action had been preceded many months prior
by the markets amending their listing standards to address perceived defi-
ciencies in the corporate governance of listed companies. There is not much
debate about whether Sarbanes-Oxley is the most significant piece of securi-
ties regulation adopted since the passage of the 1975 amendments to the Se-
curities and Exchange Act of 1934. Its significance lies partially in the fact
that it goes far beyond requiring specific financial disclosures of corporate
issuers and imposing enhanced penalties for violations of such requirements.
It also addresses directly areas such as corporate governance, auditor inde-
pendence, and the self- regulatory structure for the accounting profession that
traditionally have been solely within the purview of the states and the private
sector. This is an unprecedented action.
The Congressional mandate and the SRO's action are being imple-
mented through SEC rules. It has been a very, very busy couple of months
for the SEC and the pressure is still on. Sarbanes-Oxley and the new listing
standards are far-reaching and wide-ranging in scope. It would require an
entire course to deal with each of its provisions; therefore, this seminar will
deal with only certain portions of the Act and the related listing standards,
principally those specifically directed at corporate governance and analyst's
perceived conflicts of interest. I do not intend to cover the language of the
act or rules or attempt to interpret the provisions for you. We will take them
at face value. My approach will be to discuss or analyze the corporate gov-
ernance provisions and the analyst provision with a view to exploring
whether implementation of the rules is likely to achieve the goals of the
Congress and the markets-improved corporate governance and conflict free
research.
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(What value can I offer as a non-academic--experience and knowledge
based on the processes and dynamics of the courtroom, the regulatory and
self-regulatory environment and the boardroom)?
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
The conventional wisdom is that "good" corporate governance will
generally work, to the benefit of a company's shareholders. Indeed this
premise was reiterated in a recently published paper by Salomon Smith
Barney, which stated, "[t]he quality of corporate governance can be an im-
portant driver of shareholder value that companies with strong corporate
governance have outperformed peers in a wide range of settings." Many
argue that "good" corporate governance will also ensure good financial re-
porting and avoid corporate misfeasance. These two principles have become
articles of faith with many corporate governance experts and serve as the
primary rationale for the modification of listing standards proposed by the
markets and adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The sweeping changes mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley and the new listing
standards are a significant sea change for most companies, even though
many provisions are already considered best practices for others. Certainly
Congress and the markets believed, or professed to believe that these
changes or reforms (as some like to call them) will improve corporate gov-
ernance to an extent that will avoid a recurrence of the scandals like Enron,
WorldCom, Xerox, and Arthur Anderson. That being the case, it would be
beneficial to have a reality check on just how effective these corporate gov-
ernance rules, principally implemented through oversight by "independent"
directors, are in protecting the interests of shareholders.
There is no question that corporate governance, including strong inde-
pendent audit, compensation and nominating committees, ultimately re-
bounds to the benefit of shareholders by making management more account-
able. However, it is still open for debate as to what constitutes "good" cor-
porate governance. Therefore, one can justifiably question whether "good"
corporate governance rules (assuming one could agree on the definition)
guarantee accurate financial reporting, prevent bad judgment, or eliminate
venality in management.
Sarbanes-Oxley (and the SEC rules adopted pursuant to the Act) re-
quires Audit Committees to be fully "independent" and requires that the au-
dit committee hire and supervise the independent auditors. The
NYSE/NASDAQ listing standards (and the SEC rules implementing them)
define minimum standards of independence, mandate certain communica-
tions between independent auditors and audit committees require that Board
meet in executive session, and the audit committee meet periodically with
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the internal and external auditor without management. In addition, the
NYSE recommends, without mandating it, that Boards consider separating
the positions of Chairman of the Board from Chief Executive Officer and or
electing a "Lead Director" to chair the Board's executive sessions and act as
liaison with management. The stated objective of these rules and recom-
mendations is to ensure "good" corporate governance, however, that may be
defined, which in turn is expected to eliminate or reduce the risk of scandals
like Enron, Xerox, Global Crossings, WorldCom, and Ahold in the UK. The
question I would like to address today is whether the changes are for the bet-
ter, the worse, or neutral.
Leaving the really difficult task of defining what constitutes "good"
corporate governance for another time, it is nevertheless beneficial to evalu-
ate the implications of the "reforms" so that one's expectations for the extent
of substantive improvement in corporate behavior are realistic. In this re-
gard, it is worth pointing out that the Corporate Governance structure of En-
ron would have passed muster under the new NYSE rules. In fact, there is
anecdotal evidence that a majority of the Fortune 500 already had in place
fully independent audit committees, as required by Sarbanes-Oxley, as well
as many, if not most, of the requirements proposed by the new NYSE/NASD
listing standards. Other requirements that were already considered best prac-
tices and in place at many companies, include: 1) Increased role and author-
ity of independent directors; 2) Requirement that independent directors be
the majority of the Board; 3) Requirement that the non-management direc-
tors meet in executive session on a regular basis; 4) Mandate that sharehold-
ers vote on all equity based compensation plans, including stock option
Plans; 5) Requirement that Audit, Compensation, and Nominating Commit-
tees consist solely of independent directors, with a requirement that the Chair
of the Audit Committee have an accounting or financial management experi-
ence; 6) Mandate that listed companies adopt and publish Codes of Business
Conduct and Ethics.
Other standards are new, for example: 1) Placing sole authority to hire,
compensate, and terminate the independent; 2) Auditor in the hands of the
Audit Committee; 3) The adoption and publication of corporate governance
Guidelines; 4) The NYSE recommendation that Boards establish an orienta-
tion program for directors; 5) Tightening the definition of "independent di-
rector", including a 5-year cooling off period for, among others, former em-
ployees of the company, its auditor, and requiring the Board to affirmatively
find that each director has no material relationship with the company; 6)
Mandate that director compensation represent the sole remuneration from the
company for audit committee members; and 7) Require the CEOs of NYSE
listed companies to attest to having established and complied with internal
controls designed to ensure accuracy and completeness of information pro-
2004]
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vided to investors. The Sarbanes-Oxley act requires the CEO and CFO to
certify financial reports.
For this analysis, it may be helpful to keep in mind a fairly cynical defi-
nition of a "corporation" attributed to Ambrose Bierce who described it as an
"ingenious device for obtaining individual profit with individual responsibil-
ity." Well, if the individual investor/shareholder shoulders no responsibility,
who does? Clearly Management shoulders responsibility, but also, to an
increasing degree, the Board of Directors. However, it is important to re-
member that independent members of a company's Board of Directors are
charged with oversight of corporate management. The directors do not, and
are not expected to, manage the corporation itself. Because they are not in-
volved in a company's business on a daily basis, they can not be expected to
know, or be in a position to know, the details of every business transaction,
the vulnerability of every aspect of the corporate internal control system, or
every potential conflict of interest that may lurk behind managenent's rec-
ommendations.
For this reason, I think it is important to keep in mind three key points.
First, to the extent that listing standards and SEC rules are designed to facili-
tate the flow of information from management, auditors, and other advisors,
to shareholders and boards of directors, to the extent that the standards pro-
vide an opportunity for and encourage directors to probe and test manage-
ment's decisions. It is reasonable to expect that they will, indeed, have a
positive effect on the interests of shareholders.
Second, to the extent the "reforms" are designed to try to eliminate the
potential harm that may arise out of the conflicts of interests inherent in our
capitalist system, they are likely to be only marginally effective in protecting
shareholders and investors from venal corporate executives, if any there be.
In other words, they are neutral to Corporate Governance, but may be detri-
mental under some circumstances.
Two astute observers of the modem western cultural and social dynamic
have clearly understood the conundrum that arises from the West's belief
that unfettered quest for individual wealth affects the community at large.
George Bernard Shaw once said, "[m]ake money and the whole nation will
conspire to call you a gentleman." Mark Twain echoed a similar view when
he said, "[v]irtue has never been as respectable as money." These observa-
tions are as applicable to contemporary times as they were at the turn of the
last century and provide a touchstone for the reality check to which I referred
earlier.
With respect to the first point, in my opinion, listing standards designed
to improve the flow of information from Management to the Board, between
the Board and its outside and inside professional experts (lawyers, auditors
and accountants) most definitely benefit shareholders' interest. Experience
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has proven that opening lines of communication are essential if Boards of
Directors and particularly, audit committees are to do their job. Without the
ability to obtain timely information and the means to test and probe the in-
formation received, directors will not be in a position to monitor manage-
ment's business strategies and financial reporting activities or the outside
auditors' review and testing of those business strategies and reporting activi-
ties. Thus, such reforms are an improvement of Corporate Governance.
With respect to my second point, many of the new rules focus on com-
pensating for real and perceived conflicts of interest. However, you cannot
eliminate bad judgment with rules. The value of these new standards should
be measured by the views of Mr. Beirce on corporations and Mr. Shaw and
Twain on money. Those views, of course are very cynical; however, it is
difficult to deny that they are well-grounded in our nation's cultural and eco-
nomic fabric. That is not to say that rules in general, and listing standards in
particular, cannot be useful tools in efforts to corral greed, bad judgment, and
general venality. I simply believe that we should be realistic about the long-
term chances for success.
Absent an environment that informs the Board and its committees and
encourages them to ask pointed, tough questions about management's poli-
cies, practices and procedures, test management's decisions, and developing
confidence in the quality of the work of outside experts, Boards will not be in
a position to get comfortable enough to conclude that management and the
professionals on whom they rely are doing their jobs properly. Several of the
changes made to listing standards as a result of the 1998 Blue Ribbon com-
mittee and those adopted by the markets last Fall are designed to achieve
precisely this goal.
Currently, listing standards require communications between auditors
and the audit committee on key issues such as the independence of the audi-
tor, the quality of management's accounting estimates and judgments, and
the identification and explanation of unadjusted differences in the financial
statements. They also require audit committees to meet at least four times a
year to discuss matters pertinent to good financial reporting, such as man-
agement letter comments, accounting issues relating to potentially problem-
atic projects or transactions. This requirement that the independent auditor
provide the audit committee its opinion on the quality of management's ac-
counting estimates and judgments was a significant improvement. Previ-
ously, management could technically be in compliance with GAAP, but per-
haps not be fairly reporting its financial results. Witness Enron's disclosure
of its innovative use of "special purpose entities." The disclosure was buried
in the financial statements, but nevertheless was picked up by a couple of
analysts who took issue with the strategy's appropriateness, but missed or
ignored by the rest of the world, including an under-funded, over-worked
2004]
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SEC. It is essential to ensuring that the Audit Committee is aware of just
how conservative or aggressive the company's accounting practices are. The
rule-based requirement that the disclosure be made makes it easier for the
auditor to sound an alarm if necessary.
The requirement of private sessions between the outside and internal
auditors was also an innovation that fosters free and open communication.
Inclusion of this mandate in listing standards in 1998 was the first step in
making the outside auditors ultimately accountable to the Board of Directors
rather than management. Recent changes to listing standards went even fur-
ther in fostering open lines of communication and thus assisted the Board of
Directors in carrying out its oversight responsibilities by requiring private
sessions with members of management and that management report and dis-
cuss a range of corporate information beyond quarterly and annual reports.
For example, the June 2002 amendments to national listing standards require
management to discuss with members of the board, specifically audit com-
mittees, the company's risk assessment procedures, risk management poli-
cies, and compliance and regulatory matters. This "new rule" is in fact a
"best practice" that has been followed by major corporations for a number of
years to a greater or lesser degree. It is the independent director's job to lis-
ten and question what is being said and insist on an appropriate response
from management. Directors should shy away from the latter role. It is es-
sential to effective oversight. A key change however is the requirement that
the independent auditor report to the committee any concerns it has in this
area.
Furthermore, Sarbanes-Oxley as implemented through SEC rules re-
quires the CEO and CFO to certify the accuracy of the company's financial
statements to the audit committee. This requirement is new and represents a
major development in that it requires communications between the audit
committee and executive management in a critical area where previously
such communications were limited to those received on a periodic basis from
the internal and external auditors. It is, in my view, a significant step for-
ward for several reasons. The requirement calls for senior management, par-
ticularly the CEO, to focus in a very meaningful way in the preparation of
the financial statements and most particularly in accounting estimates and
judgments. This requirement has brought about considerable changes in the
attitude and the process by which financial statements are prepared. Persons
involved in that process (which depending on the size of the company may
number in the dozens OR the hundreds) truly reflect on the significance of
what they know before signing affidavits attesting to financial statements. In
addition, both Sarbanes-Oxley and the NYSE listing standards require the
CEO to report to the audit committee, on at least an annual basis, on the ade-
quacy of the design of the company's internal control system and on its ef-
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fectiveness. The independent auditors are required to attest to management's
assertion. As good internal controls are at the heart of the reliability of good
financial reporting, this single new rule provides more comfort as an audit
committee member than any other rules, ensuring that financial statements
are reasonable and fairly stated.
In light of the recent trend towards specifying the duties of directors in
increasingly detailed rules, it is appropriate to emphasize an important point.
Independent directors will not become "god" directors simply by focusing on
"jumping through the hoops" rather than really thinking about and becoming
engaged in the oversight process. One of the problems with the increased
focus on the Board and the emphasis on specific rules is that people become
more concerned about touching all the bases rather than exploring and under-
standing the issues. It bears repeating that it is the independent director's job
to question. Pointed questions about accounting practices, risk management,
and internal controls should be asked regularly so that all that needs to be
said or should be said, are said.
For example, the new NYSE listing requirements mandate that a major-
ity of a listed company's Board be "independent". I happen to agree with
this rule; however, it is worth noting that it is not at all clear that requiring a
Board to be dominated by "independent directors" as that term is defined in
the new NYSE listing standards will inevitably and inexorably produce
"good" corporate governance (the Smith Barney findings?). It is worth not-
ing that except for a couple of bells and whistles, the Boards of Directors of
Enron, Global Crossing and Tyco met today's definition of "independence"
and most certainly met the definition of yesterday. Yet the Board of Enron
found it in their hearts to conclude that they could and should waive a corpo-
rate code of conduct to authorize the Company's CFO to engage in a busi-
ness clearly in conflict with the interest of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers. The Tyco Board and the General Electric Board had no qualms about
approving incredible, at least to us mere mortals, compensation packages for
their CEOs. In my view, the reigning definitions of independence do not
help those selecting director or serving as a director focus on the attributes at
the heart of "being independent". It has very little to do with interlocking
directorships, making charitable contributions to an institution affiliated with
a director or buying the services or products of a company with which a di-
rector is associated. What it is about is the independence of mind and spirit.
A director must be prepared to speak his or her mind and to resign from the
directorship if necessary.
There are other changes, either mandated or recommended, in the new
listing standards adopted by the NYSE, which appear to be designed to
eliminate or mitigate the potential for negative consequences of conflicts of
interest. Experience suggests that these will be less effective in achieving
2004]
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their purpose and more burdensome than they are worth. More importantly
they may have unanticipated consequences that could prove to be detrimental
to a good system of corporate governance.
For example, the notion of a "lead director" promoted by some corpo-
rate governance experts has crept into the NYSE listing standards through
the requirement that the independent directors designate and identify, in the
proxy statement, the director who will preside at the executive sessions of the
Board. This misguided rule is apparently premised on the concept that a
single director must be named in order to "facilitate communications by em-
ployees and shareholders directly with the non-management directors". This
is simply not the case. In fact, anyone who receives a proxy statement or has
access to EDGAR will know who the directors are and how to reach them.
This concept of designating a Director to lead the private sessions is a bad
idea, not just because it is unnecessary, but also because it does not serve its
stated purpose, namely to "empower non-management directors to serve as a
more effective check on management". To the contrary, it creates another
communication layer and possible barrier between the Board on the one hand
and management, employees, shareholders and others on the other. It is sim-
ply too easy for that unnecessary additional layer to become a funnel that
restricts and limits the flow of communication rather than increases it.
Furthermore, it vests in a single director more authority and power than
the others, thereby fractionating the power of the Board as a whole. Fur-
thermore, isolating a single director can make the person more vulnerable to
corruption, as occurred in Tyco International. In that case, not only did the
presence of a lead director fail to prevent scandal, the director himself had
been accused of violating his fiduciary duty.
To be sure, leaders emerge on a Board. To the extent that Board needs
to be "led" it is usually with respect to a specific area that falls within the
bailiwick of a particular committee. The Committee Chair then is the "ideal"
lead director "in situ" that the entire Board addresses specific issues in its
private sessions or management as is appropriate. In fact under the current
system any director is free to request that items be added to the Board's
agenda or that the Board addresses a specific matter. No director should
have to run a gauntlet with respect to such a request.
All directors should have integrity and be vigilant, informed, and inde-
pendent. They should not be invited to relax and let the "lead director do it".
An appropriate response to this new listing standard would be to have
the Chair of the Executive sessions of the Board rotate among the Chairs of
the Company's various committees. This solution avoids an unhealthy
concentration of power and reduces the likelihood of individual director
apathy.
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A requirement should exist that the Chair of the Audit Committee have
an accounting or financial background. Clearly, it did not avoid a financial
debacle at Enron or WorldCom. Furthermore, the requirement that the com-
pany certify that at least one member of the audit committee is a "financial
expert" as defined by the SEC.
Of course, it is important to be able to understand what the CFO and
Auditor are trying to tell you about their financial accounting systems and
reporting process. Therefore, having people on the audit committee who
understand (or who are willing to learn the difference between a debit and a
credit) is a place to start. However, an inquiring mind is a more important
attribute than technical accounting or financial expertise. The Enron fiasco
provides the perfect example of an audit committee that was well qualified
and financially very knowledgeable, from the point of view of credentials-
and that is all that the rules mandate. Thus, Enron's demise demonstrates
that expert knowledge of accounting, auditing, and finance is no silver bullet.
The Chairman of the Enron Audit Committee was the chair of the accounting
department of a prestigious university; its members included CEOs and a
former regulator of a financial market. So much for technical expertise.
The problem with certification requiring at least one financial expert,
and the identification of that person is that there are few if any members of
audit committees that are anxious to be labeled as such. In fact, quite the
opposite is true!
Clearly, there is no shortage of strongly held opinions and beliefs about
what constitutes good corporate governance. As I can tell, for about the past
30 years, corporate governance has been determined by what looks goods
and sounds right, and less on "what works". This may not be an area suscep-
tible to strict scientific study, but surely it is capable of analysis with a view,
which allows us to draw some conclusions about the "why" of what works
and what does not and what generates shareholder value and what does not.
Since 1999, a number of changes in corporate governance have been made
based on the observations and suggestions of self appointed experts who
discuss what "looks good," "feels right" or "ought to be". In view of the
accepted need for corporations to aspire to high corporate governance stan-
dards, it is hoped that someone will conduct a long and rigorous analysis of
the situation, and a short study on the moralistic pronouncement on what
ought to be.
Salomon Smith Barney has reviewed and summarized the findings of a
number of researchers and authors in the areas of finance, economics, ac-
counting and strategic management. Without reading each of the studies, it
would be imprudent to rely on the solidity of the researcher's methodology
or soundness of their conclusions. However, Salomon Smith Barney's paper
entitled "Best Practices in Corporate Governance: What Two Decades of
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Research Reveals" offers some interesting, if not provable, conclusions. The
study focused on published literature on seven topics: Board Compensation,
Board Committee Composition, Board and Committee Meetings, Board size,
Stock Ownership Charter/Bylaws, and Additional 2003 Criteria based on
Sarbanes-Oxley and newly proposed listing standards and looked for empiri-
cal support for the prevailing points of view.
Among other things, the authors found empirical support for the propo-
sitions that: 1) Independent directors should constitute a majority of the
Board; 2) The audit, compensation and nominating committee should consist
only of independent directors; 3) The Board should number less than 15; and
4) Directors should be compensated in stock. Whereas, the authors found no
or little empirical support for the propositions that: 1) The CEO should be
the only insider on the Board; 2) The Board should meet without the CEO; 3)
The CEO and Chairman of the Board should be separate; and 4) Those op-
tions should be expensed.
In their concluding observations the authors of the Salomon Smith
Barney report concluded that no one set of governance rules fit all firms and
situations. They correctly point out that for United States corporations it is
assumed that the Board's objective is shareholder wealth maximization.
Different regulations, laws and cultural forces may drive the model in other
jurisdictions. They recommend that when designing a corporate governance
structure, boards and shareholders should take into account the industry, its
growth opportunities, its size, and the need for different skills and expertise.
POST MORTEM ON THE 2002 ATTACK ON RESEARCH ANALYSIS: WAS IT
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE OR A SALEM WITCH HUNT
The stock market bubble of the 1990s coincided with the growth of the
STAR system for analysts employed by financial services companies. Re-
search analysts, whether simply a necessary, and even an essential element in
the capital raising and stock brokering business, are the people who suppos-
edly knew the economic fundamentals, and were supposed to be able to in-
form the public if a company's business plan and future prospects were good,
bad, or indifferent depending upon the circumstances applicable to that com-
pany. This perfectly sound process morphed into stock picking contests, and
the analyst who got the most answers right was celebrated in the press and
compensated by his or her employer like a "Star." That was the beginning of
the end of an honorable profession.
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